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The housing market is the theme of the Reports to the 2008 Annual Meeting of the Royal
Netherlands Economic Association. Current housing market policies in the Netherlands gener-
ate substantial welfare losses. The direct and indirect subsidies on housing distort the housing
market, house moving behaviour, the labour market and the asset portfolio of households. The
welfare loss is estimated at more than 6 billion euro per year. In addition, physical planning
restrictions cost at least 3 billion euro per year, a price which is paid for the conservation of open
space and nature, especially in the Green Heart of the Randstad. Developments on the housing
market over the last fifteen years and the sizeable welfare losses from current policies are suffi-
cient reason to develop an agenda for reform. The Reports suggest several elements for such an
agenda, including a gradual reduction of housing subsidies in the owner–occupier sector as well
as in the rental sector, an easier land policy to better meet the qualitative housing needs of the
population, and an extension of the social tasks for the housing societies.
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1 INTRODUCTION
This communication gives an overview of the Reports to the 2008 Annual
Meeting of the Royal Netherlands Economic Association (Don (2008)). The
theme of the 2008 Reports is the housing market in the Netherlands. As in
most countries, the government interferes heavily with the housing market
through rules and regulations as well as through subsidies and taxes. The
Reports provide a critical review of the motives for and forms of government
interference. They highlight the associated welfare costs, both in the housing
market and in related areas like the labour market, household financial port-
folios and agglomeration dynamics. Future housing demand is assessed and
the future role of the housing societies is discussed. Several options for policy
reform are put forward and some of them are examined for their macroeco-
nomic impact.
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Section 2 provides some background to the Reports and includes a brief
sketch of recent developments and current problems in the housing market.
Section 3 summarizes each of the six Reports. Section 4 draws some conclu-
sions which aim to contribute to developing a realistic agenda for policy
reform.
2 BACKGROUND
The housing market has been the subject of much debate in the Netherlands
over the last few years. To a large extent this was the unintended result of
government decisions. The political deal between the current coalition parties
not to prepare or even investigate any change in the tax treatment of owner-
occupied housing during the present cabinet term rather stimulated the pub-
lic debate and encouraged independent research. The conflict with the hous-
ing societies over their contribution to the program for reinvigorating the
most vulnerable problematic neighbourhoods has put the spot-lights on the
mismatch between social responsibilities and formal governance in that sec-
tor. In response to the broadening of the corporation tax base, some hous-
ing societies are considering whether and on what terms they can leave the
system. This has made questions about command and ownership of the large
net wealth of the societies more urgent.
Developments on the housing market in the Netherlands over the last
fifteen years also give ample reason for reconsideration of its institutional
setting. Market prices for houses have risen strongly and much faster than
construction costs for new homes (see Figure 1). This has caused a widening
of the gap between the rental sector and the owner–occupier sector, as well
as an increase in insider/outsider-problems in both sectors.
The rental sector is dominated by the housing societies, which can ask rel-
atively low rents because they have no need to make market rates of return
on their large equity capital (valuing their houses at market prices) – a pri-
vate equity would see golden opportunities. In addition many tenants are
entitled to a rent allowance from the government. As a result, net housing
costs in the rental sector are far below market rates. New entrants often have
difficulty finding a home, because in many municipalities the housing societies
have long waiting lists for low-rent homes. Tenants are not inclined to move,
also if they no longer belong to the target group of the housing societies. The
private rental sector cannot offer a comparable quality/price ratio and houses
in the owner–occupier sector have also become comparatively expensive (see
again Figure 1).
In the owner–occupier sector, enormous capital gains in the market
value of their homes have accrued to the insiders. The tax subsidies to
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Figure 1 – House price, rent level, construction cost and new construction in the Netherlands,
1970–2005. Source: CPB
owner–occupiers1 have grown fast in money terms and are sensitive to house
prices and mortgage interest rates. At the same time the high prices imply
that the owner–occupier sector has become almost inaccessible to outsiders
(entrants on the housing market and renters), unless they have a substan-
tial capital or a high income. Yet a further analysis shows that affordability
of owner-occupied houses has not changed much over the period 1985–2005
(Renes et al. (2006)). This fits in with the conclusion that the strong increase
in house prices was largely caused by the determinants of housing demand,
i.e. growing income, growing wealth and decreasing interest rates. Housing
supply does not or hardly respond to the strength of demand, though invest-
ment in the quality of houses has definitely increased. The elasticity of sup-
ply is constrained in particular by physical planning regulations. The result-
ing scarcity premium largely flows to the owners of the land, often munici-
palities or owner–occupiers, for whom a larger premium does not act as an
incentive to build more or higher quality houses.
What are the detrimental effects of the current housing market regime?
To an economist, the first loss is the suboptimal allocation of scarce
resources: due to the massive direct and indirect subsidization too much is
spent on housing, i.e. the marginal social benefit is smaller than the marginal
social cost. Only a small part of the subsidies can be justified as a correction
1 These tax subsidies are mainly determined by the net effect of (i) mortgage interest
deduction at the progressive tax rate applicable to labour income; (ii) the low imputed rent
income which is taxed at the same progressive rate; (iii) the 6% transfer tax on any house
resale; (iv) exemption of the value of the house (net of mortgage debt) from the flat tax on
imputed return to net assets.
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to market outcomes, viz. where social interests are insufficiently reflected in
purchasing power. Because the larger part of the subsidies is funded by taxes,
they lead to higher tax rates with all the concomitant distortions.
Next, there are all kinds of improper impediments to house moving, both
in the rental sector (rent protection and regulation, waiting lists) and in the
owner–occupier sector (transfer tax). As a result, also the allocation within
the housing market is suboptimal. And finally the current housing market
regime has negative side effects on other markets: impediments to house mov-
ing also distort the allocation on the labour market and the tax treatment of
owner-occupied houses distorts the financial portfolio decisions of homeown-
ers, because it favours mortgage debt over equity for financing the house.
Recently many researchers have studied the functioning of the housing
market and its effects on other markets; the Reports draw heavily on these
and add some new results themselves. The Dutch Council of Economic
Advisors (REA (2006)) and the Dutch Council for Housing, Spatial Planning
and the Environment (VROM-raad (2007)) have published advisory reports.
Policy recommendations have also been formulated in some research stud-
ies. The Committee of Social and Economic Experts of the Social and Eco-
nomic Council is working on an exploratory study. Opinions differ as to
what a proper housing market regime should look like. If an agreement
would be reached on the long term target, then it would still be difficult
to find a practicable way to get there. Next to public interests the hous-
ing market affects large private interests (vested interests) which can obstruct
change.
The ambition of the collected Reports to the 2008 Annual Meeting of the
Royal Netherlands Economic Association is to suggest elements for a realis-
tic agenda for the various parties on the housing market, based on up-to-date
knowledge and taking into account the relevant constraints, side effects and
public support.
3 OVERVIEW OF THE REPORTS
3.1 Physical Planning and Redistribution
The first Report, by Paul Besseling, Lans Bovenberg, Gerbert Romijn and
Wouter Vermeulen, starts with an analysis of the arguments for government
intervention on the housing market. The authors conclude that most exter-
nal effects on this market cannot justify large interventions by the central
government. Regulation of land use in urban areas often is better left to
local authorities. Only for some issues in physical planning (open space and
nature), and possibly for redistribution, the proper policy level is the national
government. These two themes are then further taken up for the Netherlands
and analysed in depth.
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The authors estimate that physical planning regulations in the Nether-
lands have a shadow price (impose a regulatory tax) which now on aver-
age amounts to about one third of the house prices. On the other hand they
generate direct benefits (regulation rents) in the form of scarcity premiums
and capital gains. The net welfare loss in terms of foregone consumer sur-
plus on the housing market is estimated by the authors at 3 billion euro per
year. In addition there are unknown welfare losses that flow from the fact
that physical planning regulations also prevent the reaping of agglomeration
benefits from further growth of cities, indirectly depress labour supply and
increase the volatility of house prices. It is difficult to say whether these losses
are balanced by a gain of at least the same size in the form of open space
and nature – the value of the “Green Heart” of the Randstad and the buffer
zones between the four big cities is hard to assess.
The redistribution which is effectuated through the housing market is quite
substantial in the Netherlands: housing costs of tenants and owner–occu-
piers are now subsidized at a net rate of almost 29 billion euro per year,
16 billion of which comes at the expense of the central government (i.e. the
tax payer) and 13 billion at the expense of the landlords (mainly housing
societies). In fact this entails hardly any real redistribution between different
income groups and the subsidies almost cancel the burden of the regulatory
tax that is imposed on the housing costs by the physical planning regulations.
But it does generate a welfare loss which the authors estimate at more than
6 billion euro per year, as a result of distorted incentives in the housing mar-
ket, house moving behaviour and the labour market. In addition it generates
a welfare loss of unknown size by distorting the decision to rent or buy and
the decisions on the asset portfolios of private households.
Thanks to the policy regime in the rental sector, a large number of people
at a low income level can live in a larger and better home than would other-
wise have been the case. But perhaps they would have been better off with a
form of income support which is independent of the rent they pay.
3.2 Housing Needs and Impediments
In the second Report, Piet Eichholtz and Thies Lindenthal provide a long
term perspective, looking far back in time as well as far into the future.
Looking back until 1550 they show that the increase in real housing rents
that has occurred over the last decades is an exception in a long histori-
cal perspective. Also in an international comparison the house prices in the
Netherlands are exceptional. In explanation the authors point to the impedi-
ments for housing supply which resulted from physical planning restrictions,
from an overemphasis on social housing in building projects, and from the
growing delays caused by bureaucratic procedures and democratic participa-
tion before a building project can go ahead. Despite their complaints, hous-
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ing societies and project developers in fact often do not really have an inter-
est in faster procedures or limits to participation: to a large extent the rents
of scarcity flow to them and the local municipalities. Thus the parties that
determine actual construction volumes lack a strong incentive to reduce the
delays.
Looking into the future, the authors focus on the prospective demand for
housing. This cannot be simply derived from a population or household fore-
cast. From their own research on a large and detailed set of microdata for the
UK, the authors conclude that human capital is the key determinant of the
demand for housing. Application to the Netherlands indicates a continuing
growth of housing demand until 2050, though at a slower pace after 2030.
Probably the hypothesis that elderly people consume less space will cease
to hold in the future, hence replacement investments will also be required.
The official forecasts used by the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and
the Environment systematically underestimate the demand for housing that
should really be expected. It is true that more second homes than before will
be located abroad, but within the national borders elderly people will move
from the Randstad to the provinces of Flevoland, Drenthe, Friesland and
Zeeland.
The uncertainty in demographics, household formation and housing needs
calls for maximum flexibility of housing supply. The taste of Dutch citizens
for single family homes with a garden is at odds with the taste of policy mak-
ers for large scale high risers within current city borders.
An affordable housing market requires an easier land policy, redestining
much more agricultural land for residential purposes. The farmers’ organisa-
tions can perhaps go along if the profits of redestination do not fall to the
small group that sells its land, but to the farmers collectively. To speed up
housing production, the central government should arrange for shorter pro-
cedures and less scope for appeals.
The apparent shortage of low-rent social housing should not be solved by
building more for the housing societies, but by improving the stream of real-
locations. If rent liberalisation is a bridge too far, then a strict system of
means testing should ensure that those who can afford it pay a normal mar-
ket rent for their home.
3.3 Housing and Work
The third Report, by Frank van Oort, Thomas de Graaff, Gusta Renes and
Mark Thissen, studies the connections between the economic dynamics and
the housing market in the Randstad. In the Northern wing of the Rand-
stad, business, financial and creative services get all the space they need, but
the supply of high-quality housing for the concomitant workers stays far
behind. This may harm the economic development. The tension generates a
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regional premium on the house prices, referred to as a scarcity premium by
the authors.2 The scarcity premiums are high in the Randstad, especially in
and near Utrecht and Amsterdam. These areas are characterized by relatively
high economic growth nearby and a relatively low growth of the housing
stock.
The rental sector is quite large in the urban areas of (greater) Rotterdam,
(greater) Amsterdam, Utrecht and The Hague. The system of rent con-
trol allows only rent increases based on inflation or cost indices, ignoring
the agglomeration benefits which generate higher economic growth in the
urban centres. Hence the gap between the rental and the owner–occupier
sectors is particularly visible in the Randstad. The shortage of houses for
sale induces households to stay in a regulated rental house, even if their
income rises. This is comparatively most common in (greater) Amsterdam
and (greater) Rotterdam. The result is an inefficient allocation of public
funds.
The dynamics of housing and work is a simultaneous process. In a model
for the Randstad, the largest effects are those from growth in the labour
force to employment growth in the education, retail trade and government
sectors, and to a lesser extent in the business services industry. Also, popu-
lation growth follows growth of the former sectors. While in other countries
one finds that “housing follows work” as well as “work follows housing”,
the dynamic pattern in the Netherlands tends to be different. This is due to
the fact that the Netherlands has many restrictions on the choice of a hous-
ing location, especially in the Randstad. In the Randstad, the development
of housing locations leads to additional employment; if housing construction
were neglected in the Randstad, then in the long run employment growth
would suffer.
The authors conclude that a stronger coordination of housing policies and
employment policies could better exploit the economic potential of the urban
regions. To promote economic growth, agglomeration benefits of the Rand-
stad should be better facilitated through the construction of houses for the
higher income groups, in particular in the Northern wing. The physical plan-
ning policy to safeguard the Green Heart against building activities, hampers
the engine for economic growth.
3.4 The Housing Societies
What are we going to do with the housing societies? This is the question
discussed in the fourth Report, by Annet Bertram and Jan-Kees Helder-
man. They show how politicians have increasingly lost trust in the housing
2 In the other (sub)sections, the scarcity premium is defined as the difference between the
market price of new houses and all costs that had to be made in building it.
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societies after they became less dependent on government both financially
and formally in 1992. The loss of trust is explained by doubts about perfor-
mance, poor supervision, high salaries and large and fast increasing net assets
of the housing societies. Along different lines, successive ministers have tried
to define clearer relations with the housing societies, with mixed results. Of
present interest are the intense debate on the program for reinvigorating the
most vulnerable problematic neighbourhoods (who will pay?) and the legal-
financial position of the housing societies and their assets (is it possible and
reasonable to levy corporation tax on their core business? can a housing soci-
ety leave the system?).
The debate about the proper functioning of the housing market is mainly
triggered by questions about the efficiency of the large subsidies and by prob-
lems in the regions where demand is well in excess of supply. The authors
note that none of the established parties on the housing market (owner–occu-
piers, housing societies, municipalities, builders) has an interest in reduction
of the tax deductibility of mortgage interest. In regions where the hous-
ing market is tight, a liberalisation of housing rents will lead to a further
growth of the net wealth of the housing societies. This adds to the impor-
tance of the question how this social capital is allocated. Legally the unequiv-
ocal answer is housing, but this can get a liberal interpretation. The gov-
ernance structure is vulnerable to undermining by processes that pull it too
far towards government, towards the market and/or away from its civic
basis.
Quite separate from these discussions, parties at the local level have
managed to forge coalitions for reinvigorating the most vulnerable neigh-
bourhoods. Here the housing societies play a crucial role because, together
with the schools, they have unique knowledge of local circumstances and
the situation of vulnerable families. Using recent practical experience from
the municipality of The Hague, the authors show how the traditional hous-
ing tasks are supplemented by concrete actions to improve living conditions,
health (especially for young people), problem families, naturalisation and the
neighbourhood economy. These actions also involve other social organisa-
tions. The municipality regains coordination and supervision, after a long
period of control by central government.
This opens a perspective on a package of social tasks that can grow to
include several sectors. The housing societies are in a position to take a lead-
ing role, they have the know-how and the capital to reach beyond the tasks
they have taken up so far. Not further away from the government as more
or less independent enterprises, but clearly semi-public with a broad social
task. The authors sketch a step-by-step program to help realize this ideal
and to help the parties involved transform themselves. After an experimen-
tal phase and a sound evaluation, the final step is adjustment of the legal
structures.
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3.5 Reducing and Rebuilding Subsidies
In the fifth Report, Johan Conijn focuses on the role of consumption subsi-
dies on the housing market. His analysis of the motives, size and impact of
the subsidies starts from the public interests and market failures that have
been identified in the literature. The affordability of housing proves to be
the central theme; there is no reason for the government to intervene in the
choice between renting and buying.
To assess the size of current subsidies, Conijn determines a subsidy-free
point of reference which reflects the price of a housing service without subsi-
dies in a balanced market. This leads him to a smaller estimate of the size of
subsidies than the one used by Besseling et al. in the second Report, which
is derived from Romijn and Besseling (2008). Because the subsidies in the
owner–occupier sector force house prices up, they also force up the free mar-
ket value of rental houses, which in the approach of Romijn and Besseling
yields a higher estimate of the implicit subsidies resulting from rent regulation
and the rent policies of the housing societies. Starting from the subsidy-free
point of reference, subsidies in the rental sector are almost 40% (5½ billion
euro) smaller than in the calculations of Romijn and Besseling. This line of
thought reveals an important interaction between the market for owner-occu-
pied houses and the market for rental houses. In the owner–occupier sector
subsidies force up prices by about 20%, while subsidies in the rental sector
force down the prices of (occupied!) rental houses. The latter effect can grow
as large as 80% on the assumption that the current tenants will stay for the
rest of the expected life of the house. The housing societies protect the rent-
ers against the price-raising effect of subsidies in the owner–occupier sector
and against arbitrage by landlords who can make profits when houses move
from the rental sector to the owner–occupier sector. As long as owner–occu-
piers benefit from tax subsidies, a market rate for rents would imply that the
tax benefit of owner–occupiers leads to a loss for the renters.
After analysing the current regime, Conijn discusses the framework and
direction for a reduction of current housing subsidies, which he characterizes
as a waste of money. He points out that many other advisory reports have
paid no or insufficient attention to the affordability problem and its variation
over locations and circumstances. The advice of the VROM-raad puts afford-
ability first, but it leaves the current (implicit) subsidies in the rental sector
largely unaffected.
Adopting the motto “No subsidisation, unless”, Conijn searches for a
reduction in generic subsidies which is realistic and warrants affordability for
the low-income groups. He advocates a very slow reduction of tax subsi-
dies in the owner–occupier sector, to allow inflation help curtail the nomi-
nal losses in asset values and the associated financing problems. The addi-
tional tax revenues can be returned to the residents, partly through a reduc-
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tion of taxes and partly in the form of a specific affordability subsidy. One
will also have to find a way of returning the subsidy reduction in the rental
sector, which at first mainly shows up as benefits for the housing societies.
In a recent experiment, the participating housing societies use the additional
income from closer to market rate rents to improve affordability for the low-
and medium income groups. However, it is not self-evident to expect such a
return from the entire sector of housing societies.
Next to a reduction of current subsidies, a build-up of safeguards for
affordability is required. In particular if the price of housing consumption in
principle equals the user costs, then the need for a housing subsidy is even
stronger than in the current regime. Conijn sketches some principles for a
simple housing allowance, building on the current rent allowance.
3.6 Macroeconomic Aspects
In view of the size of the money flows and asset values involved, any change
in the housing market regime will have to take the macroeconomic con-
sequences into account. In the sixth Report, Casper van Ewijk and Harry
ter Rele consider the macroeconomic aspects of the housing market. They
focus on the effects of increasing – or decreasing – house prices in the
Dutch situation. These effects run especially through the wealth and con-
sumption levels of family households; the rental sector plays only a minor
role.
The housing market has gained considerably in macroeconomic impor-
tance over the last few decades. The large increases in house prices in the
nineties have raised the value of owner-occupied houses from 163% of annual
net household income in 1980 to 439% in 2007. As a result, owner-occupied
houses now account for more than half of net household wealth (including
pension rights). The price increases can well be understood from the develop-
ment of the determinants of housing demand – there are no indications that
the 2007 prices are the result of a speculative bubble. Yet there is a risk that
prices will fall; this will occur, for example, if the real interest rate rises or if
incomes (are expected to) deteriorate.
In the period 1996–2002, the increase in housing wealth has contrib-
uted approximately 0.4 percentage points to the annual growth of GDP. A
future decrease in house prices could have negative effects in the short and
medium run. But in the long run, more precisely: for future generations,
the effects of lower house prices are positive, because housing will then be
cheaper.
A reduction of tax subsidies for owner–occupiers would trigger such a
decrease in house prices, but also generate additional tax revenues which can
be returned to the residents to mitigate the negative effects in the short and
medium run. If the additional revenues are returned in a generation neutral
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way, then the result is a loss for older generations (their loss in housing
wealth is larger than their gain from lower taxes) and a gain for younger
and future generations (who will benefit many more years from lower taxes).
Older house-owners have benefited most from past increases in house prices.
And the true size of intergenerational effects of reduced tax subsidies will also
depend on the consequences of lower house prices for the value of inheri-
tances and on the impact of smaller off-balance reserves in housing societies.
Also within generations large differences will occur, for instance as a result of
differences in home-ownership, mortgage debt and number of children (share
in inheritance).
The intergenerational differences could motivate a concomitant adjustment
in government debt, which would generate fiscal room for accommodating
losses in wealth of owner–occupiers. But forms of gradually reducing the tax
subsidies, like discriminating between old and new home-ownership, appear
to offer better targeted solutions to the transition problems.
4 TOWARDS A REALISTIC AGENDA
The sizeable annual losses in welfare that have been indicated by Besseling
et al. are sufficient motivation for developing an agenda for reform of the
housing market. The various Reports also show that drafting such an agenda
is far from easy. What elements should it at least contain?
4.1 Environment
First it should be clear what the environment of the housing market will
look like in the upcoming decades. Eichholtz and Lindenthal point out
that housing demand will continue to grow until 2050, though at a smaller
pace after 2030. Moreover they warn against building more low-rent social
houses and observe that large-scale high risers do not match the tastes of the
population.
Physical planning is also crucial for the future environment of the hous-
ing market, in particular the question whether the current boundaries of
the Green Heart will be maintained. The Reports by Besseling et al. and
Van Oort et al. show that these impose a large tax, which will rise further in
the future. Is the Green Heart worth it? Ultimately, only politics can answer
this question. But it is no coincidence that Eichholtz and Lindenthal call for
an easier land policy, to better meet the qualitative housing needs of the pop-
ulation. Better quality housing might be preferable to a large metropolitan
park at an hour away. And these need not be conflicting demands, if we are
willing to literally give them more space.
In any case it is desirable to speed up house building by shortening pro-
cedures and reducing the scope for appeals.
262 HENK DON
4.2 Owner–Occupier Sector
The reduction of tax subsidies in the owner–occupier sector, while return-
ing the additional tax revenues in some way, is bound to have redistrib-
utive effects. These effects can be mitigated and spread over time in a
transition period of several years and perhaps also softened by additional
policy measures. It is more difficult to cushion the loss in wealth that owner–
occupiers suffer because of the likely fall in house prices. An extensive tran-
sition period cannot help much to reduce this fall, as future reductions in
subsidies also affect the current asset value of the house. The losses need not
be a big problem for those owner–occupiers who have recorded large capi-
tal gains in the period of price increases. Recent home-owners are hit harder,
though price levels may already have been depressed when they bought their
house, reflecting an increasing chance of future reductions in subsidies. Tar-
geted compensation is not simple. Van Ewijk and Ter Rele suggest to dis-
criminate between old and new house-owners, which would imply that also
elderly owner–occupiers would keep a favourable regime. Such a solution will
be needed more if the decrease in house prices is not only the result of the
reduction in tax subsidies, but also of an easing of physical planning restric-
tions. It is also conceivable to reduce the tax subsidies for old house-owners
at a lower pace than for new house-owners.
At the macroeconomic level the losses in asset values will temporarily
depress consumption. This reduction in demand may be compensated by
simultaneous stimulation of house construction, for example through faster
procedures or an easier land policy. Anyhow, a fall in house prices will also
reflect less pressure of spatial demand, and hence a lower regulatory tax from
physical planning restrictions and a lower scarcity premium for the land-
owners.
4.3 Rental Sector
Apart from the rent allowance, a reduction of subsidies in the rental sector
is difficult because the savings do not flow to the government but largely
to the housing societies. They can use them to safeguard affordability, tai-
lored to location and circumstances. But the size and allocation of the savings
that are returned are beyond (direct) control of the government. This prob-
lem is closely related to the broader debate about the position of the housing
societies and the social capital under their management. Bertram and
Helderman advocate an extension of the social tasks of housing societies to
several sectors, in cooperation with municipalities, schools and other social
organisations. Recent experience with reinvigorating vulnerable neighbour-
hoods provides hope for an effective approach. The financial power of the
housing societies will have to match the package of tasks that is agreed upon.
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A redesign of the financial relations can also incorporate the requirements for
a liberalisation of the rental sector.
Such a major operation will take several years. In the meantime the alloca-
tion on the housing market can improve if market rates are charged to those
renters who do not (anymore) belong to the target group of social housing
policies.
The interaction between the owner–occupier sector and the rental sector
calls for a careful coordination of reforms, as is stressed by Conijn. It should
be avoided that tax subsidies in the owner–occupier sector hurt the actual
housing costs in the rental sector through the upward forcing of market
prices.
5 CONCLUSION
Three years ago, I called the housing market the missing item on the reform
agenda (Don (2005)). Previous research in this field had not gained much
attention. In the political debate, proposals for liberalising the rental sector
were set against proposals for changing the tax treatment of owner-occupied
housing. Since then, the housing market has been discussed a lot and many
studies and advisory reports have been published. They have also shown how
complex the matter is and how close the interconnections are between the
various problems on this market. This is again confirmed by the present col-
lection of Reports. I hope it can also contribute to disentangling the knot
and to developing a realistic and welfare-increasing agenda for the housing
market.
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